By Manos Karayiannis
Public discourse is flooded with discussions for and against the ongoing Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Curiously, there are few references to the Cyprus question, which has occupied a central place in Greek foreign policy since the 1950s. Some argue, sometimes bluntly, that Greek-Turkish relations should be decoupled from the resolution of the Cyprus problem. , saying significant opportunities would have been missed.
The truth is that efforts to find a solution to the problem have virtually stalled since the 2017 negotiations in Crans-Montana. Ankara has established a situation that allows it to maintain the upper hand. It is very unlikely that the Turkish side will abandon this strategic advantage in the near future. Nevertheless, the Erdogan regime continues to harm the Republic of Cyprus: illegal drilling in the waters of the Cypriot EEZ, violations of Cypriot airspace, opening of the closed city of Famagusta, instrumentalization of migration and unilateral actions in the buffer. The common denominator of these actions is the military presence of the occupying forces on the island.
The recent incidents at Pyla against UN forces are very worrying. This specific community is the only one with a mixed population, consisting of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Ankara is preparing the ground to achieve the definitive partition of the island. Furthermore, the construction of the illegal road linking Pyla to the occupied region of Aksaray responds to obvious military logic. Pyla is close to Larnaca airport and the Dhekelia power station. In a future military crisis, control of the wider Pyla area would cut off the Famagusta Free Zone from the rest of the territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. This “frontier” part of the island is the heart of the tourist industry (Ayia Napa, Protaras), with all the implications for the Cypriot economy.
If Turkey one day dares to launch a large-scale military operation in Pyla, who will really try to stop it? The EU does not have its own army, the United States often turns a blind eye to keep Turkey in the Western camp, and Russia is preparing to modernize its pseudo-state with the opening of a consulate. Does anyone really believe that a military crisis in Cyprus will not profoundly affect Greek-Turkish relations, even if it ends in The Hague? The simple fact that Athens maintains military forces on the island (ELDYK and ELDYK 3/1) practically means that our military involvement is a given. It is often said that Greece and Turkey have not fought since joining NATO in 1952. This is not entirely accurate. In the summer of 1974, the invaders immediately attacked Greek forces in Cyprus, leading to heavy fighting in Nicosia. Dozens of Greek soldiers were killed or captured, and some unfortunately remain missing.
Greece has specific obligations towards Cyprus which it cannot waive. As one of the three Guarantor Powers, Greece remains committed to the security of the Republic of Cyprus. The unfortunate involvement of the Greek military junta in the coup against the Cypriot government of July 15, 1974 means that Athens owes a moral debt that cannot be erased. Most importantly, the Greek Cypriot community cannot survive without Greece’s unwavering diplomatic and military support.
The big question is whether attempts to improve Greek-Turkish relations will help resolve the Cyprus issue. If the political dialogue with Ankara is conducted within a predetermined framework based on the United Nations Charter and international law, Cyprus will benefit. A new relationship between Athens and Ankara could reduce tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and possibly lead to a just and lasting solution for Cyprus. Regardless, the Turkish Cypriot leadership is fully controlled by Ankara.
In the highly unlikely event that Athens makes significant “concessions” on “sovereignty adjustment,” Ankara would conclude that its coercive strategy in the Aegean Sea has yielded the desired results. Thus, the Turkish side will have no serious reason to adopt a moderate position towards Cyprus and avoid provocations. Inevitably, it will continue to promote the two-state solution until conditions allow certain countries (e.g. Azerbaijan and Pakistan) to diplomatically recognize the pseudo-state. However, no Greek government can remain passive in the face of such injustice. The fate of Cyprus is closely linked to that of Greece. This should be understood by everyone.
Mr. Manos Karayiannis is Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia and Reader in International Security at King’s College London. His book, “Deterrence and Defense”, is published by Papadopoulos.
(This article has been translated from its original Greek)
